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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
opinion that any connection was merely speculative seems, on the basis of the
record presented, to be more accurate.
This Court goes further in this case than in any previous similar one in
upholding the presence of a sufficient causal connection.80 As a result, future
claimants will probably find it easier to prove causal connection and, thus, may
recover greater amounts of damages.
Tortfeasors In Pari Delicto-No Indemnification
The problem of indemnification between joint tortfeasors was recently
considered in the case of Harrington v. 615 West Corp.81 In this case a tenant
recovered a judgment against her landlord and a painting contractor engaged by
said landlord, when she tripped over a rope laid by the contractor while on her
way to a clothesline maintained for the convenience of the tenants. The Court of
Appeals, affirming trial term, dismissed the landlord's cross complaint against
the contractor for indemnification, after it had been reinstated by the Appellate
Division.s2
The crucial problem involved in the present appeal concerns the right of
indemnification as between the co-defendants. Clearly the weight of authority
in this jurisdiction recognizes the right of recovery of a passive wrongdoer over
against a primary, active wrongdoer whose misconduct created the dangerous
condition.8 3  It then becomes necessary, once the joint delinquency of the
defendants has been established, that the dealings between the parties be observed
so as to ascertain whether their negligence is active or passive.8 4 This Court in
approaching the problem held that the negligence of both defendants lies solely
in their failure to take proper precautions as to the danger created by the rope,
with the knowledge of each that the rope was there and that tenants were
accustomed to pass that way. Consequently the negligence of each co-defendant
was active; thus barring any application of the rule of indemnification as between
active and passive wrongdoes s 5
The dissent, relying on the opinion of the Appellate Division, contended
that the act of the painting contractor in placing the rope without the proper
80. Ibid.; Brooks v. Rochester Railroad Co., 156 N.Y. 244, 50 N.E. 945 (1898);
Wilker v. State, 284 App. Div. 996, 135 N.Y.S.2d 342 (3rd Dep't 1954); Avesato v.
Paul Tishman Co., 142 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
81. Harrington v. 615 West Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 476, 161 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1957).
82. 1 A.D.2d 435, 151 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1st Dep't 1956).
83. Hyman v. Barrett, 224 N.Y. 436, 121 N.E. 271 (1918); Tipaldi v. Riverside
Mem. Chapel, 298 N.Y. 682, 82 N.E.2d 585 (1948).
84. McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 464
(1952).
85. Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Compagnia, 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (1892).
192
COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
precautions constituted active and primary negligence, while at best the landlord
could only be charged with passive negligence for failing to correct a. dangerous
condition. 6 In answer to this the majority emphasized that the contractor was
not liable for the mere placing of the rope, but for his failure to take proper
safety precautions. It therefore follows that when the landlord knew of the
dangerous condition and failed to take the proper safeguards he also became
guilty of active negligence.
The conclusion reached by this court indicates that the existence of notice,
either actual or constructive, to the landlord of the dangerous condition changes
his position from a passive to an active tortfeasor. Thus, being placed in pari




Burke v. City of New York"s involved a city's right to indemnity against a
co-defendant street railway. Plaintiff had been injured due to defective trolley
car tracks. The railroad had contracted with the city to keep these tracks in good
repair, although they were not presently being used. In consideration for this
covenant, the city did not demand the track's removal when the defendant
company changed from trolley to bus transportation. The company also
covenanted that its liablity in relation to the presence of said tracks would
be the same as before the cessation of trolley operations.
The majority uses a two-fold argument to hold for the city. First, they
feel the city had a right to rely on the railway's contract to keep the streets in
good repair.89 Although a municipality has a non-delegable duty to keep its
streets in a safe condition, when one contracts with a municipality to maintain
part of the street, in consideration for a self-benefiting use of said streets, he in
effect contracts to perform that duty to the public in place of the municipality.90
Secondly, the Court feels that under the clause in the contract, that the
company's liability would be the same as before the cessation of trolley operations,
the city has a right of indemnification. This liability emanates from section 178
86. Dollard v. Roberts, 130 N.Y. 269, 29 N.E. 104 (1890).
87. Wischnie v. Dorsch, 296 N.Y. 257, 72 N.E.2d 700 (1947).
88. 2 N.Y.2d 90, 157 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
89. City of Rochester v. Campbell, 123 N.Y. 405, 25 N.E. 937 (1890).
.90. City of Brooklyn v. Brooklyn City Railway, 47 N.Y. 475 (1872).
